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NATIONAL CREDIT REGULATOR VERSUS NEDBANK LTD AND THE 
PRACTICE OF DEBT COUNSELLING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
DW de Villiers* 
 
1 Introduction 
 
The National Credit Regulator1 approached the then Transvaal Provincial Division of 
the High Court (TPD) in 2008 by way of a notice of motion.  The Regulator prayed in 
terms of Section 16(1)(b) of the National Credit Act2 for the proper interpretation of 
certain sections of the same Act.  Those sections related mainly to the practice of 
debt review, and more particularly the role of a magistrate when hearing a proposal 
referred to the Magistrate's Court by a debt counsellor.3 
 
The implementation of debt review mechanisms provided for in Sections 86 and 87 
of the NCA led to conflicting views, as expressed by debt counsellors, the Regulator, 
the major banks and magistrates.  Uncertainty and confusion with regard to the 
proper interpretation of these two sections of the NCA followed.4  Contradictory 
decisions given by magistrates also hindered the effective application of the NCA as 
regards debt restructuring.5 It was even possible that there were serious 
shortcomings in the NCA itself, which should be addressed by appropriate 
amendments of the Act.6 
 
The Regulator therefore lodged an application to obtain clarity on some of the 
difficulties that debt counsellors experience in practice.7  The matter was heard in the 
                                                 
* Dawid de Villiers MA (Stell) LLB DTh (UNISA) MCom (Pret).  Attorney and debt counsellor, 
University of Pretoria Law Clinic, University of Pretoria. 
1 Established under section 12 of the National Credit Act, 34 of 2005.  
2   34 of 2005 (hereafter NCA). 
3   Applicant’s heads of argument to the National Credit Regulator’s application for a declaratory 
order in terms of S 16 of the NCA, National Credit Regulator v Nedbank Ltd 2009 6 SA 295 
(GNP) (hereafter Heads) para 2. 
4  Heads para 17. 
5  Founding affidavit in the notice of motion, National Credit Regulator v Nedbank Ltd 2009 6 SA 
295 (GNP) (hereafter Founding affidavit) 7. 
6   Founding affidavit 7. 
7 National Credit Regulator v Nedbank Ltd 2009 6 SA 295 (GNP) (hereafter Declarator) 299. 
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TPD on 2 March 2009 and judgment was handed down by Du Plessis J on 21 
August 2009.8  
 
2 Critical analysis of the declaratory order 
 
The Regulator sought fifteen declaratory orders.9  The first nine prayers related to 
the role of a magistrate hearing matters referred to him under Sections 86 and 87 of 
the NCA and the applicability of the Magistrate's Courts Act10 and its Rules.  The 
tenth to fifteenth prayers dealt with a number of practical issues and other 
interpretive difficulties that are, strictly speaking, not dependent on a finding 
regarding the role or power of a magistrate and the applicability of the MCA and its 
Rules.11 
 
This article analyses the prayers and the resulting orders critically in three sections 
for the sake of expediency, namely: 
 those prayers that deal with the NCA and the Magistrate's Court; 
 those prayers that deal with the role of the debt counsellor in debt 
restructuring; and 
 those prayers that deal with the application procedure to the Magistrate's 
Court.  
 
2.1 Sections 86 and 87 of the NCA and the Magistrate's Court 
 
Although these prayers concern mostly civil procedure and do not impact directly on 
the debt counsellor's business as such, they involve the support structure without 
which no debt restructuring can be viable.   
 
2.1.1  Procedure after a Section 86(7)(c) finding 
 
Section 86 is silent on the procedure a debt counsellor should follow after he/she has 
'issued' a proposal recommending that the Magistrate's Court make orders as 
                                                 
8   Declarator 295. 
9  Heads para 30. 
10  32 of 1944 (hereafter MCA). 
11  Heads para 32. 
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contemplated in Sections 86(7)(c)(i) and (ii).  The applicant submitted that although 
Section 86(8) does not refer to the procedure to be followed when a 
recommendation in terms of Section 86(7)(c) is made,12 Section 86(8)(b) should 
apply in such a case, and that the debt counsellor should refer the recommendation 
to the Magistrate's Court for a hearing under Section 87.13  Order 1 in terms of 
Prayer 15 was granted, thereby closing a hiatus in the NCA’s formulation of Section 
86(8): 
 
On a proper interpretation of section 86(8)(b), it applies in the circumstances 
contemplated in section 86(7)(c).  
 
The first to sixth respondents submitted that the provisions of Section 86(8)(a) 
should also apply to cases in which the consumer was found to be over-indebted.  
The Court points out that a finding of over-indebtedness in terms of Section 86(7)(c) 
sets in motion a debt re-arrangement process that is not voluntary.14 Should the 
parties settle the matter and agree on a re-arrangement plan, nothing prevents them 
from seeking a consent order.  However, for settlement negotiations to take place, 
Section 86(8)(a) is not explicitly required. 
 
In light of the spirit of the Act that all parties participate in good faith,15 it is submitted 
that credit providers' response to debt-restructuring proposals in terms of Section 
86(7)(c) should be requested prior to applying to court for an order in terms of 
Section 87.  If the proposal is accepted by the credit providers, a consent order by 
the Magistrate's Court can be obtained.  In Haupt, Roestoff and Erasmus,16 it is 
proposed contra curiam that Section 86(8)(a) be amended to provide for this option 
and to clarify any uncertainty in this regard.  
 
Regulation 3 of the Draft Debt Counselling Regulations17 addresses the same issue 
pertaining to the procedure when a proposal in terms of Section 86(7)(c) is referred 
                                                 
12  S 86(8) only pertains to a recommendation in terms of Section 86(7)(b), while S 86(9) pertains to 
the procedure initiated when the debt counsellor rejects the debt review application in terms of 
S 86(7)(a). 
13  Scholtz et al Guide para 14–17. 
14  Declarator 305. 
15 See S 86(4). 
16 www.ncr.org.za 95. 
17  GN R503 in GG 32229 of 15 May 2009. 
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to court.  Regulation 3 provides that the debt counsellor must lodge the proposal 
through Form B, which must be filed as soon as it has been delivered to the 
consumer and credit providers.  Such a proposal must be substantiated by a written 
statement, which must contain the information set out in Sub-regulation 2.  The credit 
providers affected must be informed that they may oppose the proposal by filing a 
notice18 through Form C with the clerk of the court and deliver a copy to the debt 
counsellor.19 
 
While the Draft Regulations give more clarity, Roestoff et al20 submit that an 
amended Section 86(8) should allow for a contested recommendation to be made in 
terms of Section 86(7)(c) and alternatively a consent order to be obtained, should all 
credit providers agree to a restructuring proposal in terms of Section 86(7)(c).  The 
new Section 86(8) should add Subsection (7)(c) as an option to Subsection (7)(b). 
 
The above change affects findings made in terms of Sections 86(7)(b) and 86(7)(c).  
In both cases, it would then be possible to acquire either a consent order or a 
restructuring order when the proposal is contested. 
 
2.1.2 Judicial or administrative role of the Magistrate's Court 
 
In Prayer 4 of its notice of motion,21 the Regulator sought an order declaring that in 
the discharge of his/her duties under Section 87 of the NCA, the relevant magistrate 
fulfils an administrative role as opposed to a judicial role.  Consequently he/she must 
comply with the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 199622 
and the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act,23 and must devise appropriate 
procedures that would facilitate an inexpensive, fair and expeditious hearing in terms 
of Section 87 of the NCA.24 The respondents contended on the other hand that a 
magistrate fulfilled a judicial and not an administrative role.25 
                                                 
18  Draft Regulation 3(4) stipulates the required content and the manner in which and when the 
notice must be delivered. 
19  Roestoff et al 2009 PER 274. 
20  Roestoff et al 291. 
21  Notice of motion 3. 
22 Hereafter Constitution. 
23 3 of 2000. 
24  Heads para 42; Scholtz et al para 11–28. 
25  Heads para 43. 
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The Court points out that a magistrate dealing with a matter referred to the 
Magistrate's Court is called upon to make a number of possible findings on 
contentious matters.26 The magistrate must decide whether to accept or reject the 
debt counsellor's recommendation with respect to the consumer's application.
  
If it is 
found that the consumer is over-indebted, the magistrate will have to consider 
whether the consumer's obligations must be re-arranged.  With regard to the 
provisions of Section 86(7)(c)(ii), the magistrate will then also have to consider the 
manner in which the re-arrangement is to be structured.27 
 
Each of the findings mentioned involves a consideration of the relevant evidence, the 
making of factual findings, a consideration of the relevant statutory and other legal 
provisions, rules and principles and, finally an application of the law to the facts.28  In 
most cases, the findings will aim to resolve one or more disputes between two or 
more parties.  The essential elements of a judicial function are resolving disputes 
and generally making findings based on the application of law to the facts.29  
Accordingly, the Court found that in discharging his/her duties under Section 87 of 
the Act the relevant magistrate fulfilled a judicial role.  Prayer 4 was accordingly 
dismissed.30  
 
In light of other orders granted by the Declarator, this decision makes sense.  The 
applicant's reasons for requesting a more administrative procedure were clear, 
namely speed, simplicity and costs.  However, the Court arguments were also 
convincing that the function of the magistrate is more judicial in nature and not only 
administrative.  Apparently, there is no precedent for the so-called administrative 
hearing procedure in the Magistrate's Court, and the statute does not allow the 
flexibility to 'create' such a sui generis process.31  It is submitted that another body, 
for example a tribunal, should be used for this purpose.  It is common knowledge 
that the National Consumer Tribunal can also issue consent orders.32 
 
                                                 
26  Declarator 306. 
27  Declarator 306. 
28  Declarator 306. 
29  Old Mutual Life Assurance Co SA Ltd v Pension Fund Adjudicator 2007 3 SA 458 (C) para 12.  
30  Declarator 306. 
31 Declarator 307. 
32  NCA S 27(a)(i). 
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2.1.3  The NCA and the powers of the Magistrate's Court 
 
In Prayer 3 of its notice of motion,33 the Regulator submits that the magistrate to 
whom a recommendation has been referred by a debt counsellor derives his/her 
power from the NCA and not from the MCA.  
 
The Court34 contended that Prayers 1 and 3 address the same essential issue of the 
procedure to be followed when a matter is referred to the Magistrate's Court under 
Sections 86 and 87.  The respondents argued that the Rules of the Magistrate's 
Courts be followed and sought a different declaratory order.35  The applicant, on the 
other hand, contended that the MCA and the Rules do not apply.  The narrow 
question that Prayer 3 raises is:  from which act does the Magistrate's Court derive 
its relevant powers?36  
 
The proposition can be made that the jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Courts must be 
deduced from an Act of Parliament.  The powers under discussion are derived from 
the Act.  This, according to the Court, is confirmed by Section 29(1) of the MCA, 
which provides that "subject to the provisions of this Act and the National Credit Act 
2005, the court, in respect of causes of action, shall have jurisdiction” in a variety of 
matters that are listed in the section.37  
 
However, the conclusion that the powers are partly derived from the NCA does not 
entitle the applicant to the order it seeks, the Court pointed out.  The prayer does not 
address the dispute between the parties, that is, whether the MCA and the Rules 
apply to matters referred to the Magistrate's Court under Sections 86 and 87.38 The 
real issue is apparent from the first to sixth respondents' counter-application.39 The 
question remains whether the MCA and the Rules do apply to referrals in terms of 
Section 86.40  
                                                 
33  Notice of Motion 2. 
34  Declarator 307. 
35  Declarator 307. 
36  Declarator 307. 
37  Declarator 308. 
38  Declarator 308. 
39  Declarator 308. 
40  Declarator 308. 
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The Court conceded that the referral of a matter to the Magistrate's Court under 
Section 86(8)(b), in particular, constitutes an extraordinary procedure created by the 
Act.41 The procedure is out of the ordinary because it concerns a lis or suit between 
the consumer and his/her credit providers, but the initiative to refer it to court is taken 
by a third party, the debt counsellor who acts as pro forma applicant.42 The 
procedure concerns a suit because by applying to be declared over-indebted the 
consumer is seeking at least a re-arrangement of one or more of his/her obligations.  
That entails, or may entail, a failure to comply with the terms of agreements with 
credit providers.  
 
The fact that the procedure is out of the ordinary does not necessarily imply that the 
MCA and the Rules do not apply here.43  These Rules prescribe the manner in which 
matters are brought before court and the manner in which the Court then deals with 
them.  It is assumed that Parliament by way of legislation may prescribe procedures 
that differ from the Rules.  However, if there is no such prescription, the relevant 
Rules of the Magistrate's Court must be followed.44  
 
The consumer's initial application for debt review must be in a form prescribed by the 
present Regulation 24.  A consumer who applies directly to the Magistrate's Court 
under Section 86(9) must also do so in the prescribed manner and by Form 18.45  
Section 86(8)(b) obliges a debt counsellor to refer certain matters to the Magistrate's 
Court, but does not prescribe any procedure.  It follows that in such cases the MCA 
and the Rules apply.46 In the result the Court made an Order 3 in accordance with 
Prayer 3 of the first to sixth respondents' counter-application: 
 
The power of a Magistrate's Court to conduct a hearing in terms of section 
87 of the National Credit Act, 2005 and to make appropriate orders in 
consequence thereof is derived from section 87 read with section 86 of the 
said Act, and the Magistrate's Courts Act, 1944 and the Rules of the 
Magistrate's Courts govern the procedure by which it may conduct itself in so 
doing.  
 
                                                 
41  Declarator 309. 
42  Declarator 309. 
43 Declarator 309. 
44  Declarator 310. 
45 Reg 26. 
46  Reg 26. 
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This order is to be understood in light of the dismissal of Prayer 4 above.  It is 
obvious that the Court, after declining the call for an administrative hearing 
procedure, now has to explain which procedure should in fact be used.  The Court's 
argument is that the MCA and its Rules are the basis for any proceedings, although 
the NCA also has to be taken into account.  Since the Magistrate's Court has no 
inherent discretion to vary and adapt, the incumbent and well-known procedures 
have to be applied.  The process can still be called a "hearing", but has to be 
confined within the statute and provision of the Rules. 
 
2.1.4  A referral is not an application 
 
In Prayer 1 of its notice of motion,47 the Regulator sought an order declaring that a 
referral of a recommendation by a debt counsellor to a Magistrate's Court in terms of 
Section 86(8)(b) of the NCA does not constitute an application for the purposes of 
the MCA or the Rules.  This is another strategy furnished by the Regulator to stay 
clear of the cumbersome and, in their opinion, the purpose-defeating application 
procedure.  
 
The applicant argued that Section 86(8)(b) of the NCA does not explicitly require a 
debt counsellor to make an application to a Magistrate's Court.48 A debt counsellor is 
authorised under Section 86(7)(c) of the NCA to issue a proposal recommending that 
a Magistrate's Court make either or both of certain defined orders.  In terms of 
Section 86(8)(b) of the NCA, a debt counsellor must refer the matter to the 
Magistrate's Court with his/her recommendation.  Section 86(8)(b) makes no 
reference to an application, but mentions a referral.  By contrast, Section 86(9) 
permits a consumer whose application to a debt counsellor has been rejected by 
such debt counsellor to apply to a Magistrate's Court for an order contemplated in 
Section 86(7)(c) of the NCA.  The legislature has drawn a distinction between the 
words "application" and "recommendation" in a number of sections, including 
Sections 87(1)(a) and 88(1)(b). 
 
                                                 
47  Notice of notion 2. 
48  Heads para 36. 
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It follows, according to the applicant,49 that if the referral by a debt counsellor of 
his/her recommendation to a Magistrate's Court is not an application for the 
purposes of the MCA, such referral does not need to comply with the MCA or its 
Rules, more particularly, with Rule 55.  The Court did not entertain the applicant's 
arguments50 and made the following Order 4: 
 
A referral by a debt counsellor to a Magistrate's Court under section 86(8)(b) 
and section 86(7)(c) of the National Credit Act, 2005 is an application within 
the meaning of the Magistrate's Courts Act, 1944 and the Rules of the 
Magistrate's Courts and falls to be treated as such in terms of Rule 55 of the 
Rules.  
 
It is submitted that no alternative sui generis method was put in place by the NCA.  
This order enhances Order 3 above and implies that for the moment the Magistrate's 
Court can only be approached in terms of Sections 86 and 87 by utilising the 
application procedure, already set out by Rule 55 of the Court.51  Credit providers are 
to be cited as respondents, who in their turn can reply per affidavit to the relief 
sought against them.52 
 
Draft Regulations 4(9) and 4(10), if indeed applicable in respect of referrals in terms 
of Section 86(7)(c), address the issue of the Act being silent on the procedure to be 
employed in court when a 'hearing' takes place.53 Draft Regulation 4(9) reads: 
 
(9) A hearing contemplated in sub regulation (8) shall be administrative in 
nature and shall be conducted expeditiously in accordance with section 
33(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. 
 
It is obvious that the stipulations of the Draft Regulations are in direct contrast with 
Court Orders 4 and 3.54  The regulations, relying on just administration in terms of 
Section 33(1) of the Constitution, attempt to keep the hearing administrative in 
                                                 
49  Heads para 37. 
50  Declarator 310. 
51  Roestoff et al 277. 
52 Da Silva et al www.ncr.org.za 49. 
53  Draft Regulations 4(9) and 4(10). 
54  See above and section 2.1.3. 
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nature and not judicial.  Section 33(1) provides as follows:55 "Everyone has the right 
to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair." 
 
Administrative action is preferred in the Draft Regulations, since it tends to be faster, 
easier and less costly.  Some factors do benefit the process and especially support 
the already exhausted customer.  So, for example, no legal representation is 
needed, questions may be asked of the parties by the presiding officer, costs are 
minimal, no cross-examination can take place and a determination must be made in 
thirty days.56  
 
This discrepancy may cause a major confusion in legal practice.  It is submitted that 
the Rules Board should attempt to develop a sui generis procedure for matters 
referred to the Magistrate's Court in terms of Sections 86 and 87 of the NCA, which 
is less cumbersome than the one prescribed in Rule 55.  
 
According to Loots,57 the Rules Board is proposing changes to the Rules of the 
Magistrate's Courts.  A new sub-rule has been devised that will indicate the 
documentation that should be included in the application.  Since the declaratory 
order emphasised the principle of judicial oversight of all debt arrangements, the 
amended Rules will require a magistrate to decide on any orders for default 
judgment in terms of Section 58 of the MCA and even for judgment by consent.  The 
clerk of the court will then not be entitled to issue these orders on his/her own. 
 
2.1.5  Powers of the Magistrate's Court  
 
In Prayer 2 of its notice of motion,58 the Regulator sought an order declaring that the 
debt counsellor "must", in terms of Section 86(8)(b), refer the matter to the 
Magistrate's Court, should the parties have been unable to agree on a voluntary re-
arrangement.  The same reasons for granting Order 1 above apply should the debt 
                                                 
55  Constitution S 33(1). 
56  Draft Regulations 4(10).  
57  "Proposed changes". 
58  Notice of motion 2. 
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counsellor find that the consumer is over-indebted.  The Magistrate's Court must 
conduct a hearing, the Court affirmed.59  
 
Section 87(1) provides that the Magistrate's Court "may" either in terms of Section 
87(1)(a) reject the recommendation/application or in terms of Section 87(1)(b) grant 
the orders mentioned, the Court elucidated.60 These orders are the only ones that 
the Magistrate's Court can make.  The reason for this is that the Magistrate's Court 
may only decide on matters "determined by an Act of Parliament".  Put differently, a 
Magistrate's Court only has those powers that were conferred by an Act of 
Parliament.61 
 
 
It is noted that the relief granted with regard to Prayer 2 does not address the form 
that the hearing must take or the procedure that the Magistrate's Court must adopt.  
This aspect has been also dealt with by the Court in Orders 3 and 4 above.62 An 
Order 2 in terms of Prayer 2 was granted as follows: 
 
In circumstances where section 86(8)(b) of the Act applies, a debt counsellor 
is obliged to refer his or her recommendation to a Magistrate's Court and the 
magistrate to whom the matter is allocated is in terms of section 87 obliged 
to conduct a hearing and make an order contemplated in either section 
87(1)(a) or section 87(1)(b) of the National Credit Act, 2005.   
 
The rationale for Prayer 2 is not clear; it appears to state the obvious.  Sections 86 
and 87 of the NCA are not ambiguous.  Perhaps some confusion in debt review 
practice is addressed by this order.  Notably, however, the Court63 does not shy 
away from using the word "hearing", which is typical of the NCA's vocabulary. 
 
2.1.6  Remarks 
 
The orders discussed above confirmed the application of the MCA and its Rules to 
debt review.  Since there is at present no sui generis procedure provided for in the 
NCA, it is submitted that the Court's approach is correct.  However, the result is that 
                                                 
59  Declarator 307. 
60 Declarator 307.  
61  Declarator 307. 
62  See the discussion in Sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 above. 
63  Declarator 307. 
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the over-indebted consumer is not supported to the degree the NCA would set out to 
attain.64 A Rule 55 procedure can be cumbersome and costly, while the NCA 
envisaged a fast and relatively inexpensive process.  
 
2.2 The debt counsellor and the Court 
 
This group of prayers deals specifically with the unique role of the debt counsellor 
with regard to debt review proceedings before the Court.  
 
2.2.1  Role of the debt counsellor 
 
In Prayer 7 of its notice of motion,65 the Regulator seeks an order declaring that a 
debt counsellor who refers a proposal to a Magistrate's Court in terms of Section 
86(8)(b) is entitled to adduce evidence and present arguments in support of his/her 
recommendation in any hearing under Section 87.  The Regulator submits that 
Section 87 of the NCA implies an informal inquisitorial hearing, rather than a formal 
adversarial one.  In other words, a magistrate should initiate, direct and control the 
proceedings, thereby permitting the debt counsellor to adduce evidence and 
advance arguments in support of his/her recommendation.66  All parties agreed in 
principle that a debt counsellor should be entitled at a hearing to furnish evidence 
before a magistrate to explain his/her recommendation.67 This is consistent with the 
spirit and object of the NCA and it is always desirable in order to assist a magistrate 
in determining which orders he/she ought to grant.68 
 
In this regard the Court found that the debt counsellor's role in terms of Section 86 is 
that of a neutral functionary who does not advance any particular party's cause.69 
The respondents sought an order that reflects the debt counsellor's role more clearly.  
The Court pointed out that there is no reason that the debt counsellor could not 
make submissions regarding his/her proposal.70 In view of his/her investigation in 
                                                 
64  NCA S 3. 
65  Notice of motion 3.  
66  Heads para 85. 
67  Heads para 90. 
68  Heads para 90. 
69  Declarator 313. 
70  Declarator 313. 
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terms of Section 86, the debt counsellor will know the relevant facts and submissions 
necessary to explain the proposal and to assist the Court.  Accordingly, the Court 
granted Order 8 as follows:71 
 
A debt counsellor who refers a matter to the Magistrate's Court in terms of 
sections 86(7)(c) and 86(8)(b) of the National Credit Act, 2005 has a duty to 
assist the court and should be available and able to render such assistance 
by way of furnishing evidence or making submissions as to his or her 
proposal or to answer any queries raised by the Court.  
 
This order brings significant clarity with regard to the role of the debt counsellor 
during court proceedings.  The debt counsellor has a duty to assist the Court.  This 
implies that he/she should be available to appear, able to give evidence or make 
submissions, and answer any queries raised by the Court.  In practice, this would 
apparently not be a normal application procedure, as it would not be possible for the 
Court to proceed when only the attorney for the applicant is present.  The debt 
counsellor must be present or on stand by.  The question is:  could a debt counsellor 
solely appear as the applicant or is an attorney always needed?  This is not common 
in court proceedings, but certainly possible with some experience on the part of the 
debt counsellor.   
 
2.2.2 Powers of the debt counsellor in terms of Section 86(8) 
 
In Prayer 14 of its notice of motion,72 the Regulator seeks a declaratory order that a 
failure to conclude negotiations arising from a proposal or counter-proposal made by 
a credit provider in response to a recommendation or proposal by a debt counsellor 
in terms of Sections 86(7)(a) or 86(7)(b) of the NCA does not preclude such debt 
counsellor from exercising his/her powers under Section 86(8).  In support of this 
prayer, the Regulator submitted that the objectives of the NCA would be defeated 
should a debt counsellor be obliged to engage in endless negotiations and 
discussions with a credit provider before he/she can refer his/her recommendation to 
a magistrate.73 
 
                                                 
71  Declarator 313. 
72  Notice of motion 5. 
73  Heads para 126. 
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The first to sixth respondents, on the other hand, adopted the view that a debt 
counsellor is not entitled to refer his/her recommendation to a magistrate, unless and 
until he/she reasonably concludes that the negotiations between a credit provider 
and the consumer are not in good faith, were terminated or are unlikely to result in a 
responsible debt arrangement.74  
 
The Court pointed out that the Act provides for negotiations if a consumer is not 
over-indebted, but experiences or is likely to experience difficulty to satisfy all his or 
her obligations in time.75  Nothing however prevents the debt counsellor, the 
consumer and credit providers from entering into negotiations in the case of an over-
indebted consumer whose matter has been referred to the Court.  However, such 
negotiations are not prescribed by the Act.  These are settlement negotiations.76 
 
Whether the parties have agreed to a voluntary re-arrangement is a fact that has to 
be ascertained in each case.  However, according to the Court, a debt counsellor 
may only refer a case of attempted voluntary debt re-arrangement to the Court, 
should he/she be satisfied that no agreement will be reached, either because a party 
has rejected the proposed re-arrangement or because there is no reasonable 
prospect that an agreement will be reached at all.  Put differently, the debt counsellor 
may only refer a case of attempted voluntary re-arrangement to the Court should 
he/she be satisfied that negotiations have been concluded or are making no 
headway.77  The Court could therefore not make an order as prayed for by the 
applicant. 
 
The Court also referred to Section 86(10) in terms of which credit providers can 
terminate a debt review at any time at least sixty business days after the time at 
which the consumer applied for the debt review.  Credit providers may delay the 
negotiation process with a view to exercising their rights under Section 86(10).  
Should a debt counsellor conclude that a credit provider is not negotiating in good 
faith, he/she may also conclude that negotiations are making no headway.  Debt 
counsellors should however be careful before reaching such a conclusion.  They are 
                                                 
74  Heads para 129. 
75 See S 86(7)(b).  
76  Declarator 317. 
77  Declarator 317. 
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advised to inform the relevant credit provider that the debt counsellor is of the 
opinion that the former is not negotiating in good faith and that the matter will be 
referred to court.78 Hasty and unreasonable conclusions on the part of the debt 
counsellor may result in adverse costs orders. 
 
As regards the counter-application, the Court also deemed it unwise to issue such an 
order.  It attempts to define circumstances under which it could be said that no 
agreement has been reached.  As that will depend on the facts of each case, a 
definition should not be attempted, according to the Court.79 As regards Prayer 14, 
the application and counter-application were therefore both refused. 
 
It is regrettable that no order was made in this instance.  Although the Court shows 
sympathy for the debt counsellor's dilemma, there is still a serious problem in 
practice.  Some credit providers do not react either timeously or at all to proposals 
for restructuring.  The tendency amongst debt counsellors is therefore to approach 
the Court directly without even trying to negotiate in case in which a Section 86(7)(c) 
finding has been made,80 as they fear termination by the credit providers in terms of 
Section 86(10).  Although the applicant's Prayer 14 states the obvious and does not 
address the real issue with regard to Section 86(7)(c), it is submitted that an 
extended order in this regard would have given more clarity.  I therefore agree with 
Roestoff et al81 that an amendment to Section 86(8) should include references to 
both Sections 86(7)(b) and 86 (7)(c) to provide for a possible consent order. 
 
2.2.3  The rules with regard to costs 
 
In Prayer 5 of its notice of motion,82 the Regulator sought an order declaring that the 
Rules of Court relating to costs and principles that generally apply to the award of 
costs in applications do not apply to hearings conducted in terms of Section 87 of the 
NCA.  In particular the general rule is challenged that costs should follow the 
                                                 
78  Declarator 318. 
79  Declarator 318. 
80  Slot Declarator discussion 
81  Roestoff et al 273. 
82  Notice of motion 3. 
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applicant, should the debt counsellor's recommendation be rejected by a 
Magistrate's Court. 
 
A proper interpretation of Section 86 of the NCA and with regard to the distinction 
between a "referral of a recommendation" as opposed to "an application to Court", 
persuaded the applicant that there was no justification for rendering the full Rule 33 
of the Magistrate’s Courts Rules applicable to a debt counsellor.83  Were a debt 
counsellor to attract an adverse costs order because of his/her recommendation to a 
magistrate, debt counsellors may then become very reluctant to make any 
recommendations to a magistrate.  A debt counsellor has no personal interest in 
his/her referral or recommendation and it would be unfair in these circumstances to 
punish the debt counsellor for the role he/she plays under the NCA.84 In addition, 
since an express provision in the NCA that empowers a magistrate to award costs 
against a debt counsellor or the debtor is absent, the applicant submitted that a 
magistrate has no power to do this.85 
 
The Court pointed out that a debt counsellor who refers an application to the Court 
under Sections 86(8)(b) and 86(7)(c) is not a litigant in the ordinary sense.  By 
referring a matter to the Court and by making a recommendation, he/she fulfils a 
statutory obligation.86 A functionary in the process of fulfilling his/her statutory 
function during court proceedings is not ordinarily ordered to pay the costs of any 
other party.  Adverse costs orders against such functionaries are usually only made 
if the functionary acted improperly or mala fide.87 The practical difficulties that 
prompted the applicant to seek the order under consideration probably resulted from 
a failure to apply this salutary principle.  Consequently, the Court made Order 5 in 
accordance with the counter-application of the first to sixth respondents,88 but added 
some introductory words in Order 6:  
 
                                                 
83 Heads para 72.  
84  Heads para 72.  
85  Heads para 73. 
86  Declarator 311. 
87  Declarator 311. 
88  Declarator 311-312. 
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Bearing in mind that the debt counsellor fulfils a statutory obligation, Rule 33 
of the Magistrate's Courts' Rules is applicable to applications under section 
86 and 87 of the National Credit Act, 2005.  [my italics] 
 
In my view, the above approach is correct.  Since the debt counsellor is an 
intermediary and not a party to the suit, he/she should be protected from unfair cost 
orders.  The Court compromised effectively between the Rules of the Magistrate's 
Courts and the spirit of the NCA. 
 
Roestoff et al89 pointed out an initial concern after the commencement of the NCA, 
namely that the fees for debt counselling were so dismal that no one would be 
interested in practising as a debt counsellor.  It has since been suggested by Du 
Plessis90 that credit providers should also bear some of the costs involved, since the 
restructuring of debt repayments would enable them to recover claims. 
  
2.2.4. Remarks 
 
The orders made under the current prayer heading are important.  It is submitted that 
the approach of the Court is correct.  The debt counsellor as applicant differs from 
the normal applicant in terms of Rule 55.  He/she is even protected against some 
cost orders because of a statutory function.  Because of this special function, the 
following question arises:  should this difference in treatment not be even greater 
than custom presently permits or proposes?  Since this function brings great 
responsibility and much paper work, should it not affect the fees that a debt 
counsellor may charge?  
 
2.3 Procedures of the court application  
 
The last group of prayers concerns the arena of the Court.  The orders granted in 
this regard affect the "business" of a debt counsellor directly.  It is submitted that 
these orders have brought clarity with regard to some difficult issues.  
 
                                                 
89 Roestoff et al 265. 
90 2007 JJS 90. 
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2.3.1  Service of court documents 
 
In Prayer 6 of its notice of motion,91 the Regulator requested an order that service of 
any recommendation or other documents contemplated in Sections 86 or 87 of the 
NCA may, with the agreement of the affected parties, be done by way of fax or e-
mail.  In support of this prayer,92 the Regulator has pointed out that a speedy and 
easily verifiable method of providing notice would be ideal, such as by fax or e-mail.  
It would be time-consuming and expensive were notices to be served by the deputy 
sheriff on each credit provider.  Were service to be effected by the deputy sheriff in 
accordance with the MCA and its Rules, few consumers would be able to afford an 
application for debt restructuring by the court.  Scholtz et al 93 argue that the 
domicilium address given by the debtor in the credit agreement should rather be 
used for the address of service. 
 
A counter-application by the first to sixth respondents suggested that Rule 9 of the 
Magistrate’s Courts' Rules should be applicable to the service of documents for the 
purpose of the reference and the hearing contemplated in Sections 86(8)(b) and 87 
of the NCA.94  This proposition was accepted and accordingly the Court incorporated 
it into Order 7 to provide more clarity on the options of service:95 
 
Rule 9 of the Magistrate's Courts' Rules pertaining to service are applicable 
to the service of process, any recommendation and other documents for the 
purpose of the referral and hearing contemplated in sections 86(7)(c), 
86(8)(b) and 87 of the National Credit Act, 2005, but service of any such 
documents may, with the agreement of the affected parties, be by way of fax 
or email.  
 
Haupt, Roestoff and Erasmus propose a new Regulation 26(4) with regard to the 
issue of notification:96 
 
                                                 
91  Notice of motion 3. 
92 Heads para 75. 
93 Para 12–13. 
94  Declarator 312. 
95  Declarator 312. 
96  Haupt, Roestoff and Erasmus (n 17) 324. 
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Notification to the relevant credit providers of an application by the consumer 
in terms of section 86(8)(b) and 86(9) may be effected by one or more of the 
following mechanisms: 
(a) personal delivery; 
(b) registered mail to the last known address of the relevant credit 
provider; 
(c) fax or email, provided that the debt counsellor is able to provide 
satisfactory proof of successful transmission of such fax or email 
or an acknowledgement of receipt be obtained from the relevant 
credit provider. 
 
Order 7 implies that an arrangement in respect of service by e-mail or fax be 
negotiated between the parties for each separate occurrence.  It is submitted that a 
standard agreement that could apply to every document that the parties deal with at 
present or in future could reduce cost and time.  This internal and ongoing 
arrangement is possibly not outside the boundaries of the Declarator's obiter dicta,97 
although the order does not explicitly commend it.   
 
A proposed amendment to the Magistrate’s Courts Rules providing for the serving of 
the application by registered post, where the creditors have not consented to service 
by fax or e-mail, is envisaged by Loots.98 
 
2.3.2 Jurisdiction 
 
In Prayer 8 of its notice of motion,99 the Regulator sought an order declaring that any 
Magistrate's Court that a debt counsellor elects to refer a recommendation to, has 
jurisdiction to conduct such hearing.  The applicant argued that Section 86(8)(b) of 
the NCA places no limitation upon a debt counsellor regarding the choice of court to 
which he/she must refer his/her recommendation.100  It follows that the court to which 
a debt counsellor refers his/her recommendation is also the court that should hear 
the matter and that has jurisdiction to do so. 
 
                                                 
97  Declarator 312: "There is, however, no reason in law why all or some of the affected parties 
cannot agree to waive service in terms of the Rules and to agree on a different form of 
notification." 
98  (n 60). 
99  Notice of motion 4.  
100  According to the applicant in Heads para 93. 
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The Court pointed out that the relief the applicant sought was based on the 
contention that the MCA did not apply to the procedure under consideration.  The 
Court already found differently in Orders 3 and 4.101  It was held in that the Court 
said that the question of jurisdiction must be decided with reference to the MCA.  
The general rule regarding jurisdiction is actor sequitur forum rei.  The plaintiff (or 
applicant) ascertains where the defendant (respondent) resides, goes to his/her 
forum, and serves him/her with the summons or notice of motion there.102 Therefore, 
an applicant must bring his/her application in the Magistrate's Court that has 
jurisdiction in respect of the person of the respondent.103  Under the debt review 
proceedings of Sections 86(7)(c), 86(8)(b) and 87, the Court held that the debt 
counsellor who refers the matter to the Magistrate's Court is the applicant.104 The 
consumer and his/her credit providers are the respondents.  
 
The applicant pointed out that one Magistrate's Court will not often have jurisdiction 
in respect of the person of all the respondents.  In order to address the problem of 
multiple respondents and to give effect to the express purpose of the Act in respect 
of debt review procedures, the Court held that the term "the Magistrate's Court" in 
sections 86(7)(c), 86(8)(b) and 87 of the Act must be interpreted to mean "the 
Magistrate's Court having jurisdiction in respect of the person of the consumer [my 
italics]".105 
 
This order is surprising and somewhat revolutionary.  The consumer now becomes 
the first respondent and therefore his person founds the jurisdiction.  The address of 
his residence or workplace can be used to cite the respondent and set the motion 
procedure under way.   
 
In my opinion, Section 86(8) should be amended, in order to address any uncertainty 
pertaining to the issue of geographic jurisdiction.106  It is proposed that the debt 
counsellor apply to the Magistrate's Court of the district in which the consumer 
resides or carries on business or is employed, or should the consumer consent, that 
                                                 
101 See Sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.4 above. 
102  Declarator 313. 
103  Declarator 313. 
104  Declarator 313. 
105  Declarator 314. 
106  Da Silva et al (n 52) 51. 
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the application be directed to the Magistrate's Court of the district in which the debt 
counsellor's business is situated.  The argument for the second option is that the 
whole cause of action as regards the debt review process originates from the district 
in which the debt counsellor's business is situated.107 
 
It should be noted that the Draft Regulations already defined "court" as a magistrate 
court established in terms of the MCA, "having jurisdiction over a consumer by virtue 
of such consumer's residence or place of business or the residence or place of 
business of a debt counsellor, irrespective of the monetary value involved [my 
italics]".108  In this regard, it is proposed that this definition for "Magistrate's Court" be 
added to Section 78 of the Act to provide for this alternative.109  If not, the part that 
reads "or the residence or place of business of the debt counsellor" must be deleted.  
 
Another amendment of Section 86(8) is in my opinion needed to make it clear that 
the debt counsellor is the only applicant in all court proceedings under Sections 86 
and 87, while the consumer is the first respondent.110 
 
2.3.3 Monetary limit 
 
In Prayer 9 of its notice of motion,111 the Regulator sought a declaratory order that 
there be no monetary limit upon the jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Courts to hear a 
referral under Section 87 of the NCA.  The Court pointed out that the NCA places no 
monetary limit upon the jurisdiction of a Magistrate's Court to hear a referral.  The 
Act provides that matters be referred to the Magistrate's Court, but makes no 
mention of a monetary limit to the jurisdiction of that Court.  In the circumstances, the 
Court held that there is no basis to hold that there is a monetary limit to the relevant 
jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Court.  To hold otherwise would defeat the purpose of 
the Act.112 Order 9 therefore provided as follows: 
 
                                                 
107 Roestoff et al 278. 
108  Draft Regulations S 1, definition of "court". 
109  Roestoff et al 279. 
110  See also Sections 2.1.1 and 2.2.2 in this case note. 
111  Notice of motion 4. 
112  Declarator 314. 
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There is no monetary limit upon the jurisdiction of the Magistrates' Courts to 
hear a referral under s 87 of the National Credit Act, 2005.  
 
An additional subsection to Section 78 that states clearly that there is no monetary 
limitation upon the jurisdiction of the Magistrate's Court with regard to debt review 
matters is suggested as the Draft Regulations in its definition of "court" has provided 
for already in Section 1.113 
 
2.3.4 In duplum rule  
 
In Prayer 10 of its notice of motion,114 the Regulator sought a declaratory order that: 
 
on a proper interpretation of section 103(5), read with section 101(1)(b) to 
(g) of the NCA: 
 the amounts contemplated in sections 101(1)(b) to (g) which 
accrue while the consumer is in default may not exceed, in 
aggregate, the unpaid balance of the principal debt when the 
default occurred; 
 once the total charges referred to in sections 101(1)(b) to (g) 
equal the amount of the unpaid balance at the time of default, no 
further charges may be levied; 
 once the total charges referred to in sections 101(1)(b) to (g) 
equal the amount of the unpaid balance, payments made by a 
consumer thereafter during a period of default do not have the 
effect of permitting the credit provider to charge further interest 
while such default persists. 
 
The amounts referred to in Sections 101(1)(b) to (g) relate to initiation fees, service 
fees, interest, cost of insurance, default administration charges and collection costs.  
The applicant's interpretation is that once the total charges under Sections 101(1)(b) 
to (g) – which include interest – equal the amount of the unpaid balance, no further 
charges (again, including interest) may be levied.115 
 
Section 103(5) describes the moment at which the unpaid balance of the principal 
debt must be fixed as "the time that [the consumer's] default occurs".  Clearly, it 
provides that the prohibition against the accrual of amounts, in aggregate, exceeding 
                                                 
113  See Section 2.3.2 above. 
114  Notice of motion 4. 
115  Heads para 108 and 109. 
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that unpaid balance holds "during the time that a consumer is in default under the 
credit agreement".  A consumer remains in default until his payments under the 
credit agreement are brought up to date.116  What the words "up to date" entail is 
uncertain. 
 
The first to sixth respondents argued that the Regulator's interpretation of Section 
103(5) would result in hardship for credit providers.  However, were all the interest, 
fees and charges contemplated under Section 101(1) of the NCA to commence 
running up again as soon as there is a purging of the default, especially by 
complying with a debt rearrangement order, many debtors would be unable to pay 
off their debts and the object of the section would be frustrated.117  The introductory 
words to Section 103(5) make it clear that the legislature intended to depart from the 
common law in duplum rule.  This departure is deliberate and there is no need for re-
importing it into the fabric of the section under the guise of equitable 
considerations.118 
 
All the respondents, other than the twelfth respondent, argued that Section 103(5) 
operates similar to the common law rule of in duplum.  They contended that if section 
103(5) is interpreted in agreement with the common law, the effect of Section 103(5) 
is only to create a moratorium on the payment of the cost of credit, while the 
consumer is in default, but it does not affect the underlying obligation to make 
payment.  Once he/she purges the default, all the cost of credit may be levied 
again.119  In contrast, hereto Scholtz et al 120 state that the common law rule "has 
now been codified and extended by the National Credit Act to provide consumers 
with even better protection".  
 
The Court held that this viewpoint is contrary to the clear wording of Section 103(5).  
This subsection applies despite "any provision of the common law", which includes 
the in duplum rule.  Furthermore, the amounts "that accrue" during the default "may 
not, in aggregate, exceed the unpaid balance".  During the period of default, no more 
                                                 
116  Heads para 110. 
117  Heads para 113. 
118  Heads para 116. 
119  Declarator 319. 
120 Para 10–17. 
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than the stated maximum can accrue.  Hence, the consumer's indebtedness in 
respect of the cost of credit cannot grow by more than the stated maximum.  
Therefore, the Court granted an Order 11 in terms of the applicant's prayer. 
 
It is submitted that the Court's approach is correct.  The order brings some clarity 
with respect to the interpretation of the statutory in duplum rule.  The respondents 
attempted to revive the common law in their interpretation of Section 103(5).  The 
Court rejected this and placed a cap on the total amount per agreement that can be 
owed, namely twice the principal debt.  Unfortunately, the exact meaning of the 
phrase "during the time that the consumer is under default" is still not clear.  The 
starting point of default is possibly the moment at which the consumer fails to pay his 
agreed instalment.  The time at which this period ends is unclear.  Is it the moment at 
which the down payments eventually cause the amount still owed to be equal to the 
original amount owed when the default began?  And if so, can the costs in terms of 
Section 101(1) run up again to the amount capped by the in duplum rule, if he/she 
defaults hereafter? 
 
Meiring121 submits that a consumer remains in default until his payments under the 
credit agreements are brought up to date, and that such a default is not purged by 
the making of part payments or at the point at which the creditor initiates litigation.  
Some debt counsellors are of the view that as regards a specific credit agreement 
the total maximum debt to be repaid can never be more than double the amount of 
the debt at the moment of default.122  However, the first and third respondent filed 
notices for leave to appeal to challenge Order 11 granted by the Court.123     
 
The judgment of the Court in this regard also affects the term of debt review and a 
possible discharge of the consumer later on.  It seems that a spiral of ever-escalating 
running costs can no longer hold the consumer ransom for the rest of his/her life.  If 
the amount is capped at double the principal debt amount at default and does not 
repeatedly run up to the capped amount, it will then be possible for the consumer to 
pay his/her debt off in time, hopefully in not more than a few years.   
                                                 
121  "Respondents' story". 
122  Slot Declarator discussion. 
123 Stadler 2009 De Rebus 47. 
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2.3.5 Reckless credit 
 
The Court accepted the first to sixth respondents' counter-proposal124 to the 
Regulator's Prayer 11125 with a slight correction:126 
 
Where a debt counsellor refers a recommendation to a Magistrate's Court 
that it find that a credit agreement is reckless, or a consumer makes an 
application to such court in terms of section 86(9) of the National Credit Act, 
2005, and the court finds that the credit agreement concerned is reckless  
(a) upon the grounds that the credit provider has not complied with 
sections 80(1)(a) and 80(1)(b)(i), the Court may make the orders 
contemplated in section 83(2); 
(b) upon the grounds that the credit provider has not complied with 
80(1)(b)(ii), and the consumer is found to be over-indebted at the time 
of those court proceedings, the Court may make the orders referred to 
in sections 83(3)(b)(i) and (ii).   
 
Order 10 sought no more than to paraphrase the relevant powers that the Act gave 
to the Magistrate's Court.  Although the impact of this order is not dramatic, it may 
still clear some confusion.  Structuring the types of reckless lending and the 
consequences thereof may assist debt counsellors, credit providers and courts to 
see the bigger picture with regard to reckless credit extension by the NCA. 
 
When drafting a referral or recommendation to the Court, a debt counsellor will be 
well advised to pray prominently for a declaration of over-indebtedness and, if 
applicable, that one or more of the credit agreements be declared reckless.  The kind 
of reckless credit extension should be pointed out, as well as a recommendation as 
to the finding of the Court in terms of Section 83. 
 
2.3.6 Emoluments attachment orders 
 
In Prayer 12 of its notice of motion,127 the Regulator seeks a declarator that a 
Magistrate's Court making an order in terms of Section 87 may also issue an order of 
the nature contemplated in Rule 65(J) of the Rules under the MCA, attaching the 
                                                 
124  Declarator 315. 
125  Notice of motion 4. 
126 In (a) Sections 80(1) and 80(1)(b)(ii) were changed to Sections 80(1)(a) and 80(1)(b)(i). 
127  Notice of motion 5. 
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emoluments of the consumer and obliging him or her to make periodic payments to 
the credit provider.128  The Regulator, appreciating the merit of an order of the nature 
contemplated in Rule 65(J), envisages a magistrate to be able to, with the consent of 
the consumer, grant an order similar to that envisaged by Rule 65(J).  This prayer is 
sought since some magistrates found that they are not entitled to grant such orders, 
even when credit providers consented thereto.129 
 
The Court pointed out that the powers of the Magistrate's Court upon a referral were 
to be found in the Act.  There is no provision in the NCA for the making of an order in 
terms of Section 65J of the MCA that deals with the emoluments attachment order.  
The order sought was accordingly refused by the Court.130 
 
It is submitted that the Court's viewpoint in this regard is correct.  However, the 
current situation is not ideal.  In practice, it is important that a consolidated debt-
repayment amount be paid over regularly to a payment distribution agency in one 
transaction.  This can very effectively be arranged by means of an order against the 
consumer's salary and could form part of the recommendation before court to be 
decided in terms of Section 87(1).  Haupt, Roestoff and Erasmus propose 
amendments to Section 87(1) to provide the Magistrate's Court with the powers to 
grant orders in this regard:131 
 
87. (1) (v) an emoluments attachment order authorising the attachment 
in the prescribed manner of emoluments at present or in 
future owing or accruing to the consumer from the 
consumer's employer by the payment distribution agent 
contemplated in subparagraph (iv). 
(vi) an order suspending, amending or rescinding any pre-
existing emoluments attachment order issued in respect of a 
judgment that was obtained after the relevant credit provider 
has taken steps to enforce a credit agreement. 
 
A new subsection (vi) empowers the Magistrate's Court to suspend, amend or 
rescind any pre-existing emoluments attachment orders.132  The aim is to give the 
                                                 
128  Heads para 119. 
129  Heads para 122. 
130  Declarator 316. 
131 Haupt, Roestoff and Erasmus (n 17) 97–98. 
132  Haupt, Roestoff and Erasmus (n 17) 98. 
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magistrate the discretion to suspend, amend or rescind emoluments attachment 
orders, should good cause be shown by the debt counsellor, for example in cases in 
which excessive interest rates are applicable.133 A creditor who is already gaining 
from an existing emoluments attachment order will have the opportunity in court to 
oppose any rescission of this order or be joined to all the other creditors.  Allowing 
the Magistrate's Court the power to grant an emoluments attachment order would, in 
my view, simplify and facilitate the debt-repayment process.  Furthermore, the new 
proposed subsection (vi) could also ensure fair treatment of all credit providers. 
 
2.3.7 Sections 86(2) and 129(1) of the NCA 
 
In Prayer 13 of its notice of motion,134 the Regulator seeks a declaratory order that 
the reference in Section 86(2) to the taking of steps refer only to the commencement 
of legal proceedings mentioned in Section 129(1)(b) and not include steps taken in 
terms of Section 129(1)(a) of the NCA.  None of the respondents opposed the relief 
sought by the Regulator in this prayer.135 
 
In terms of Section 86(2), an application in terms of Section 86(1) "may not be made 
in respect of, and does not apply to, a particular credit agreement if, at the time of 
that application, the credit provider under that credit agreement has proceeded to 
take the steps contemplated in section 129 to enforce that agreement".  Section 
129(1) prescribes certain steps that a credit provider must take before a debt is 
enforced:  
 
If the consumer is in default under a credit agreement, the credit provider– 
(a) may draw the default to the notice of the consumer in writing and 
propose that the consumer refer the credit agreement to a debt 
counsellor, alternative dispute resolution agent, consumer court or 
ombud with jurisdiction, with the intent that the parties resolve any 
dispute under the agreement or develop and agree on a plan to 
bring the payments under the agreement up to date; and  
(b) subject to section 130(2), may not commence any legal 
proceedings to enforce the agreement before– 
(i) first providing notice to the consumer, as contemplated in 
paragraph (a) or in section 86(10), as the case may be; and  
                                                 
133 Memorandum para 8.  
134 Notice of motion 5. 
135  Heads para 124. 
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(ii) meeting any further requirements set out in section 130. 
 
All the parties before court agreed that this order must be made.136 The Court 
pointed out that the purpose of Section 86(2) is to ensure that consumers do not 
apply to be declared over-indebted only to frustrate a credit provider who has already 
started to enforce a credit agreement under which the consumer is in default.  While 
Section 129(1)(a) envisages alternative dispute resolution and "a plan to bring 
payments under the agreement up to date", it does not envisage general debt 
restructuring under Sections 86 and 87.137  The steps set out in Section 129(1)(a) 
are preliminary to debt enforcement.  According to Scholtz et al,138 the legislature 
"intended the debt review process to be available to a consumer as long as the credit 
provider does not serve a summons on him".   
 
"In the absence of full argument, and in view thereof that there were many other 
persons with an interest in this order", the judge deemed it unwise to say more than 
the above and did not grant the order.139  This decision is regrettable, since 
confusion remains as regards the moment at which enforcement begins.  Van 
Loggerenberg, Dicker and Malan140 submitted that enforcement of a credit 
agreement commences upon the issuing and service of a summons, after the credit 
provider has complied with the requirements set out in Section 129(1), read with 
Section 130(1) of the Act. A Section 129(1)(a) notice delivered to a consumer by a 
credit provider does not constitute enforcement, as the heading to Section 129 
explicitly refers to "Required procedures before debt enforcement".141  The 
legislator's reference to Section 129 in Section 86(2) is rather a reference to the 
commencement of legal proceedings mentioned in Section 129(1)(b), and a 
consumer should not be precluded from applying for debt review in respect of the 
specific credit agreement after receipt of a Section 129(1)(a) notice.142  
 
                                                 
136  Heads para 124. 
137  Declarator 319. 
138 Para 11–19. 
139  Scholtz et al para 11–19. 
140  2008 De Rebus 41. 
141  Van Heerden and Otto 2007 TSAR 667. 
142  Founding affidavit para 69–71;  Scholtz et al para 12–16. 
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According to Van Loggerenberg, Dicker and Malan,143 it does not make sense to 
propose that the consumer should approach a debt counsellor and at the same time 
preclude the consumer from applying for debt review.  The interpretation that the 
Court attributes to Section 86(2) leads to an absurd result.  In order to clarify the 
uncertainty regarding the moment at which enforcement for the purposes of Section 
86(2) commences, it is proposed that Section 86(2) be amended by substituting 
"Section 129" with "Section 130".144 
 
According to Monty,145 the question still remains as to what constitutes "steps taken 
to enforce the credit agreement in terms of section 129" for the purpose of excluding 
certain credit agreements in terms of section 86(2) from debt review.  Although this is 
still unclear, Otto146 warns consumers not to ignore a notice under Section 129(1)(a), 
but rather to seek the advice of a debt counsellor timeously and definitely within the 
ten days after a Section 129 notice has been received. 
 
2.3.8  Remarks 
 
Debt counsellors should welcome most orders in this section, namely those that deal 
with the service of documents, the geographical jurisdiction and monetary limit of the 
court, and the in duplum rule.  However, the Court exercised caution with respect to 
emoluments attachments orders and the application of Section 86(2).  The lack of 
direction regarding whether formal debt enforcement starts with Sections 129(a) or 
(b), in particular, is regrettable.  This could hopefully be resolved by amending the 
statute.  
 
3 Conclusion 
 
It is submitted that the declaratory order has a definite impact on debt counselling 
practice in South Africa. 
 
The interaction between the NCA and the MCA has been defined more clearly.   
                                                 
143  Van Loggerenberg, Dicker and Malan (n 150) 40–41;  Founding affidavit para 70. 
144  Van Heerden and Otto (n 152) 668;  Scholtz et al para 12–16. 
145  "Section 129". 
146  2009 SA Merc LJ 277–278. 
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Although the procedures that have to be followed were not what some debt 
counsellors had hoped for, the declaratory order did indeed bring clarity regarding 
many aspects.  The role of the debt counsellor in court, as well as the more 
sympathetic treatment that he/she will receive in some instances, is illuminating.  
The orders dealing with the service of documents, geographical and monetary 
jurisdiction, and the in duplum rule are to be lauded. 
 
However, the impact of the Declarator was not as great as was expected.  In some 
instances, the Court did not go far enough, for example acknowledging an additional 
jurisdiction for cause of action, utilising the emoluments attachment order better and 
restricting the application of Section 86(2) to Section 129(b).  There are also 
inconsistencies between the Declarator and the Draft Regulations, which the Court 
possibly did not take into consideration or preferred not to remark upon. 
 
The Declarator is certainly a milestone in the history of the NCA.  The orders have 
influenced the practice of debt review widely, and will continue to shape the credit 
industry.  It is now for the industry, the NCR, legislators and scholars to take matters 
further. 
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